This paper studies the role of nancial reporting in enhancing the credibility of other sources of information. We nd that an interim accounting report can discipline management's investment behavior and its eectiveness increases with accounting quality. As a consequence, when accounting quality increases, the investment itself becomes a suciently credible signal of management's more valuable private information, and therefore induces a dramatic market response. In this sense, the two pieces of information serve as compliments. However, since most information has already been preempted by the investment, the market's response to subsequent earnings announcement declines. Our results are consistent with the conrmatory role by Gigler and Hemmer (1998) in that the value of accounting is o equilibrium.
Introduction
One of the most enduring questions in accounting research is studying whether mandatory nancial reporting is an important source of information for investors. Starting with Ball and Brown (1968) , numerous studies have found that accounting earnings are informative to the capital market, in that stock prices, on average, adjust to the public release of accounting earnings. However, several other studies have also noted that, for the most part, the price reaction anticipates the earnings disclosure, evidenced by the notorious low earnings response coecient and R 2 from earnings-returns regressions. For example, Lev (1989) nds that the low explanatory power (R 2 of 2%-7%) is robust to dierent lengths of the return window, and suggests that nancial reporting fails to fulll its goal. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) also nd low information content of quarterly earnings announcements.
The weak market response to earnings could result from measurement errors in earnings (Easton, Harris, and Ohlson, 1992) , investors' limited attention (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009) , the increasing complexity of nancial reporting (You and Zhang, 2009) , etc.
Meanwhile, investors are deluged with large amounts of information in reality, from sources as varied as a rm's detailed nancial statements, to fast-changing bits of gossip in social media such as Twitter. These other sources of information are usually timely, readily comprehensible, and forward looking; whereas nancial statements are periodic, more complex, and backward looking. As a consequence, other information has played an increasingly important role in facilitating investors' decision making compared to rms' nancial reports, consistent with the survey evidence.
1 In other words, nancial reports seem to play a trivial role in informing investors' about the rm's performance, as it can be easily substituted by other sources of information. Given these arguments, we face a conundrum of understanding the fundamental role of accounting and why it is important. Gigler and Hemmer (1998) are among the rst to tackle this question. They nd that mandatory disclosures play a conrmatory role in creating an environment for management to credibly communicate their more value-relevant information. As a result, the market reaction to subsequent mandatory disclosures is the weakest when they are work-1 For instance, a recent survey conducted by the National Financial Capability Study nd that 68% of investors use information directly from the company, 62% use information from nancial service companies such as analysts' reports, and 44% use media such as newspapers or online news, however, only 21% are aware of the SEC's EDGAR database. See http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/ NFCS_2015_Inv_Survey_Full_Report.pdf.
ing the best to provide credibility for voluntary disclosures.
2 In other words, accounting complements rather than substitutes for other sources of information. Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar (2012) provide supporting evidence for the conrmatory role: when rms commit more resources to nancial statement verication as measured by audit fees, management forecasting activity becomes more frequent and accurate, and market reactions to those forecasts also become more signicant.
In this paper, we broaden insights into why weak market reactions to mandatory disclosures could be a sign of accounting's fullling its role of ensuring better informed markets. The commonality between the explanation we propose and that of Gigler and Hemmer (1998) is that mandated accounting disclosures are disciplining some other visible activities, and thus compliment the value relevance of other information. In their paper, accounting disciplines voluntary disclosures; whereas in this paper, as in Kanodia and Lee (1998) , accounting disciplines rms' investment decisions. Ball (2001) suggests that one of the most important economic roles of accounting is disciplining managers' voluntary disclosures and their investment behavior. In this sense, our paper compliments Gigler and Hemmer (1998) . Another commonality is that in both cases, when accounting is working, its value is o-equilibrium. More specically, it is the threat of accounting's revealing an inecient activity that prevents the activity, and since the activity in question is prevented, it is neither revealed by accounting disclosures nor by any rational pricing.
Consequently, one cannot measure the eectiveness of accounting by only looking to the equilibrium disclosures or to equilibrium market prices.
We model a simple overinvestment problem similar to that of Kanodia and Lee (1998) to feature the disciplinary role of periodic performance reporting, such as an earnings report. Our rst result is qualitatively similar to theirs: increasing the information in the earnings report decreases the amount of overinvestment. However, because overinvestment manifests itself dierently across the two models, the informational (and therefore market pricing) implications are dramatically dierent. In their model, every rm overinvests, and the amount of that overinvestment decreases with the precision of earnings reports.
Even so, market participants are able to perfectly infer the private information on which the rm based its investment, so the price always perfectly impounds the information regardless of the precision of the earnings report. In our model, however, some rms 2 A similar model is used by Gigler and Hemmer (2001, 2002) .
overinvest and others do not. Increasing the information in the earnings report decreases the likelihood that a rm will overinvest, but in general it is impossible to tell whether a particular rm is or is not overinvesting. This feature is crucial for studying the main point of our paper: how the degree to which an investment decision reveals a rm's private information changes with the precision of the earnings reportand how this in turn aects the earnings-return relationship studied in the aforementioned empirical literature.
Our main result is that the price reaction to the earnings report can actually decrease when its precision increases. To understand the intuition, since the overinvestment is curtailed as the precision of earnings reports increases, investors are more assured that the right investment decision was made in the rst place. In other words, the decision of whether or not to invest becomes more informative about the manager's private information and about the eciency of the investment. As a consequence, investors' uncertainty about the rm's fundamental decreases dramatically upon observing the investment, which means the market reaction to the investment is overwhelmed. By contrast, when the actual earnings report comes out, investors only obtain incremental information because most uncertainty has already been resolved when the investment decision was made. This could happen because the earnings report is veriable yet a noisy and, possibly, less timely signal of management's private information (Dye, 1983; Gigler and Hemmer, 1998) . Therefore, the price reaction to earnings is only marginal.
Our results also have important empirical implications. The prior literature has been relying on value relevance, as measured by the price reaction to earnings, to evaluate the eectiveness of the nancial reporting (see, as reviewed by Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001 ). Relevance, however, is introduced by the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) as the ability to evaluate the potential eects on future cash ows (predictive value) or to conrm/correct their previous evaluations (conrmatory value). 3 Therefore, in our context, value relevance corresponds to the notion of predictive value, whereas the complementary role is consistent with the conrmatory value. Our results imply that focusing one role on a stand-alone basis while ignoring the other can cause tremendous loss of information, which is also inconsistent with the objective of nancial reporting.
Instead, the value of accounting should be measured based on its contribution to the entire information environment.
3 See the FASB Conceptual Framework: http://www.fasb.org/pv_conceptual_framework.pdf
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup. Section 3 solves the equilibrium, characterizes the complementary role of accounting, and provides the intuition. Section 4 discusses robustness, and Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are included in the appendix.
Model Setup
We model a situation in which a rm's manager makes an investment decision on behalf of current shareholders. Specically, the rm has investment capital of K and, if the capital is invested, the investment can either succeed or fail. The return of the investment, or equivalently the terminal cash ow is
While nobody can perfectly predict the outcome of the investment, we can think of the eventual return on the investment as the true unknown state of the world (because it is exogenous), and we denote the state as S and F . However, when the manager decides whether or not to make the investment, he has superior private information, which we denote as θ ∈ {G, B}, about the expected return on the investment. In the following text, we call them rm G and rm B respectively. The manager's private information θ is correlated withC as follows:
The commonly held prior belief about the investment is represented by ρ = P rob(G).
Furthermore, we assume the investment is ex ante protable only for rm G, i.e., prospects, θ, at the time when the investment was made. 5
At date 1, an interim performance report is produced if the manager invested at date 0. If the manager chose not to invest, there is no performance report. We refer to this interim performance report as an earnings reportỸ ∈ {y h , y l }. The earnings report is informative about the return of the investment and hence is correlated with θ, and the correlation is summarized as follows:
It can be easily veried that both posterior probabilities P rob(G|y h ) and P rob(B|y l ) are strictly increasing in τ , so we denote τ as accounting quality or earnings quality. Without loss of generality, we assume
We also assume that the future cash owC and the earnings reportỸ are independent conditional on θ, i.e., θ is a sucient statistic for Y with respect toC . In addition, the earnings report is mandatory and audited so the manager cannot manipulate. These assumptions altogether imply that mandatory disclosures are ex post veriable, but also less informative and less timely compared to the manager's private information.
At date 2, the rm is sold to a second generation of owners for exogenous reasons such as liquidity needs or shorter life cycles. The new generation of shareholders will receive ownership to the return on the rm's investment,C , if the capital is invested, or to the capital, K, if it was not invested. At the time of sale, potential buyers (investors) know whether or not the manager chose to invest its capital, but they do not know what the manager privately knew about the investment's prospects, θ. Instead, they must infer θ from the rm's investment decision at date 1. Buyers are assumed risk neutral and perfectly competitive, so the price of the rm is equal to the expected return on the rm's investment given all information available to the market. Gigler (1994) nds that proprietary costs can make voluntary disclosures credible even without verication. Gigler and Hemmer (1998) nd that mandatory disclosures can enhance the credibility of voluntary disclosure. Since we do not focus on optimal communication in this paper, the direct communication channel is excluded from the model.
6 Throughout the paper, we use the terms accounting quality, earnings quality and information preci-
, the accounting signal is completely uninformative.
Finally, the investment returnC is realized and distributed to the new generation of shareholders. If the manager did not invest the initial capital K, the capital is returned to the new owners.
The following timeline summarizes the model: We rst examine two benchmark cases.
Lemma 1. 1. In the rst best, rm G always invests and rm B never invests, and the earnings report is irrelevant.
2. In the second best, suppose there is no earnings report; all rms invest when ρ ≥ ρ * , and no rm invests when ρ < ρ * .
In the rst best where θ is publicly observable, the earnings report Y is not incrementally informative aboutC because they are assumed independent conditional on θ. As a result, the market price does not respond to the earnings report. On the contrary, since investors observe θ and whether the investment was made, the market price of the rm will be P g R or P b R if the rm did invest; or will be K if the rm did not invest. Because P g R > K > P b R, rm G always invests and rm B never invests. In addition, the rst best outcome can be attained if the manager is not myopic, i.e., the manager maximizes expected returns rather than market prices.
Suppose θ is privately observed by the manager, we consider two extreme cases. In the rst case when the earnings report perfectly reveals θ, it is equivalent to θ being publicly observable and the rst best is obtained. In the other extreme, however, when the earnings report is completely uninformative, it will be ignored and the market price is the same for all rms that chose to invest. Therefore, if the a priori expected payo of the investment is greater than its cost, i.e., ρP g R + (1 − ρ)P b R ≥ K, all rms will invest. In other words, the information asymmetry between the manager and investors leads to overinvestment compared to the rst best. Similarly, if the a priori expected payo is lower than its cost, no rm will invest, leading to underinvestment compared to the rst best. Furthermore, since investing is o the equilibrium path, investors cannot use Bayes' theorem if the investment is observed, but instead, they will hold certain beliefs. In this case, a natural o-equilibrium belief is that, any rm that chose to invest is B, and consequently no rm will deviate and the equilibrium is sustained.
We next consider a more interesting case in which the earnings report is informative, yet not perfectly so, i.e., 1 2 < τ < 1. We construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
At date 0, the manager privately observes θ and chooses whether or not to invest initial capital K to maximize the expected price at date 2. At date 1, an earnings reportỸ becomes public, and investors update their beliefs about θ based on the realized report as well as the conjectured investment strategy. At date 2, the stock price changes based on available public information, and current shareholders sell their shares to the next generation. Lastly, rational expectation requires that investors' conjectured investment strategy be consistent with the actual strategy taken by the manager at date 0. Therefore, the equilibrium can be written as follows: Denition 1. A PBE consists of a triplet {I(θ), P (Î(θ), y), φ(θ|Î(θ), y)}:
maximizes the expected market price conditional on observing the actual θ.
2. P (Î, y) = E[C|Î(θ), y] is the date 2 market price given the earnings report y and investors' conjectured strategyÎ(θ).
3. φ(θ|Î(θ), y) is investors' belief about θ, which depends on the conjectured strategy, whether the manager invested, and the earnings report y.
4. I(θ) andÎ(θ) coincide, which means that the conjecture obeys rational expectations.
We solve the equilibrium by backwards induction. At date 2, investors make inferences about θ using two pieces of information: the earnings report and the investment. The information content of earnings is xed and exogenous, whereas the information content of the investment is driven by investors' conjectureÎ . In equilibrium, even thoughÎ coincides with the actual I, the manager is unable to change the conjecture. Therefore, we can derive the market price by expanding the following conditional expectation: E[C|φ(Î, y)] = RP r(S|Î, y) = P r(G|Î, y)P r(S|G,Î, y)R + P r(B|Î, y)P r(S|B,Î, y)R = P r(G|Î, y)P g R + P rob(B|Î, y)P b R
The last equality follows the assumption thatC and Y are independent conditional on θ. Therefore, the stock price only depends on the posterior probabilities P r(G|Î, y) given the rm invested, i.e.,
For brevity, we denote P (y h ) = P (Î, y h ) and P (y l ) = P (Î, y l ). Therefore, anticipating that investors will hold the right conjectureÎ = I, the manger makes the optimal investment decisions at date 0. Proposition 1. There is a unique PBE in which rm G always invests and rm B invests with probability q ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
Compared to the rst best, rm B invests with probability 0 < q ≤ 1. If q = 1, both rm G and B invest and the equilibrium is pooling. If q < 1, rm G always invests but rm B takes a mixed strategy, leading to a hybrid equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium is uniqueit is either pooling or hybrid, and investors' conjecture ofÎ is equivalent to a conjecture ofq. Furthermore, the parameter q captures the level of investment ineciency resulting from the information asymmetry between the manager and investors.
Obviously, rm B is better o in the pooling equilibrium, i.e., rm B always has incentives to mimic rm G. However, this pooling equilibrium may not be attainable.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose the equilibrium is pooling and investors also correctly believe thatq = 1; as for rm B, if his expected payo from investing is greater than the cost, i.e., E y [P (y;q = 1)|B; invest] ≥ K, he will always invest and the pooling equilibrium is sustained. However, if the expected payo from investing is less than the cost, i.e., E y [P (y;q = 1)|B; invest] < K, rm B will deviate to never invest, suggesting that the conjectureq = 1 is incorrect. As a result, the pooling equilibrium is not attainable and investors will revise the belief to a point such that rm B becomes indierent between investing and not investing.
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Next, we further characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. 1. If ρ < ρ * , rm G invests with probability 1 and rm B invests with probability q (τ, ρ) < 1.
If ρ ≥ ρ *
, there exists a unique threshold 1 2 ≤τ (ρ) < 1 such that when τ ≤τ (ρ), rm G and rm B both invest with probability 1; otherwise, rm G invests with probability 1 and rm B invests with probability q (τ, ρ) < 1. The thresholdτ(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ.
3. Furthermore, q (τ, ρ) is decreasing in τ and increasing in ρ, and
In Proposition 2, we nd that high quality accounting works more eectively in mitigating the investment ineciency resulting from asymmetric information and management myopia, consistent with the prior literature. For example, Biddle and Hilary (2006) ; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) nd that higher quality accounting reduces information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital, thereby enhancing rms' investment eciency. The intuition of our result is very simple: When accounting quality increases, investors can dierentiate rm G and B with a more informative earnings report y. As a consequence, the investment becomes less protable for rm B and thus he invests with lower probabilities.
To outline the proof of Proposition 2, we rst consider the possibility of pooling equilibrium. Recall that if the a priori value of the investment is negative and the earnings report is uninformative, neither rm G or B would invest in equilibrium. After introducing an informative earnings report, however, the market price will depend on y. As a result, rm G is able to separate himself from B and thus chooses to invest. On the other hand, because accounting is not perfectly informative, rm B still has incentives to mimic rm 7 Following the literature, we assume that when an agent is indierent, he follows what the principal expects him to do.
G so the equilibrium q > 0. Therefore, mandatory disclosures eliminate the ineciency of rm G's underinvestment at the expense of rm B's overinvestment. Nonetheless, the pooling equilibrium is never attainable. To see this point, suppose the equilibrium is pooling and investors also believe so; the law of iterated expectation implies
where E denotes investors' expectation based on conjectureq = 1. In other words, the weighted average of Ey [P (y)|B] and Ey [P (y)|G] is less than K, suggesting that Ey [P (y)|B] must be lower than K.
In contrast, when the a priori value of the investment is positive, we nd that the equilibrium can be pooling if and only if accounting quality is adequately low. To understand the intuition, if the earnings report is completely uninformative, rm B's default strategy is to pool with rm G by proposition 1. When the earnings report becomes informative, rm B will realize signal y l with a high probability and consequently receive a low market price. Therefore, the earnings report helps investors to distinguish θ and therefore reduces rm B's benet of mimicking rm G. However, if accounting quality is not suciently high, the threat of being revealed is not strong enough such that rm B still takes his default strategy. As a consequence, the equilibrium is pooling and accounting fails to discipline rm B's overinvestment.
To see why the equilibrium threshold is decreasing in τ , note that rm B must be indierent between investing and not investing in the hybrid equilibrium, i.e.,
(1 − τ )P (y h ) decrease or increase with τ (?)
Suppose investors' conjecturedq does not change with τ ; intuitively, P (y l ) will go down and P (y h ) will go up as the information content of y h and y l increases. Firm B, on the one hand, is more likely to receive y l , suggesting that high quality accounting will reduce the second term τ P (y l ). On the other hand, rm B is less likely to receive y h , which means the rst term (1 − τ )P (y h ) can be decreasing or increasing in τ , depending on the magnitude of P (y h ). Taking them together, we conjecture that the negative eect on the second term will always dominate the ambiguous eect on the rst term. As a result, to bring the LHS back to K, investors will revise their conjectureq down, which consequently decreases the actual investment strategy q as well. The result conrms our conjecture. Therefore, high quality accounting information must reduce rm B's benet of mimicking rm G and ultimately his incentive.
More importantly, Proposition 2 suggests an o-equilibrium role of accounting: It is the threat that interim reports will reveal the manager's inecient investment that prevents the manager from taking the investment in the rst place. However, the inecient action becomes less likely to be observed or revealed by accounting, precisely because it is not on the equilibrium path. In other words, when we observe an inecient investment being revealed by accounting, it probably suggests that accounting was not fullling its objectives in the rst place. As a consequence, we cannot evaluate the eectiveness of accounting by looking to the equilibrium accounting disclosures or to equilibrium prices.
Our results are also consistent with the disciplinary eect of periodic performance report raised by Kanodia and Lee (1998) , but there are several dierences. First, in their model, the manager chooses the level of investment and the precision of disclosures simultaneously, and they nd that more precise disclosure can more eectively discipline the manager's investment. The bundling of the two choices is essential and has a value:
...This bundling creates a need for regulating the precision of performance reports; without regulatory intervention the economy would face a dicult implementation problem.
However, in our model, the information structure is exogenous. In reality, managers usually have limited discretion choosing the precision of accounting rules, instead, regulators design and enforce a more ecient accounting system.
In addition, we assume that the action space is discrete for two reasons. First, for modeling purposes, we want to avoid the fully revealing equilibrium of Kanodia and Lee (1998) in which the manager's action perfectly reveals his private information. Second, to ensure the information content conveyed by the manager's action can be suciently high relative to his private information, we assume that the dimension of the action space is the same as that of the state space. However, the intuition behind our model is generalizable beyond the binary setting.
Lastly, the real eects literature mainly focuses on how dierent accounting measurement rules aect resource allocations in various settings. For example, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2004) nd that measuring intangibles may be undesirable when the noise of the measurement is suciently severe, because the rm ineciently changes its allocation of tangible and intangible assets. Our denition of accounting, however, is more genericit maps from the underlying state to some interim performance reports such as earnings. As a result, one limitation is that we are unable to provide policy implications for regulators and accounting standard settings.
Corollary 1. Investment ineciency q increases when 1. The project yields higher cash ow on success.
2. The project is more likely to succeed.
3. The investment cost is lower.
The comparative statics are also intuitive. When the investment is more protable as represented by a larger P g , P b or R, or when the cost of investing becomes lower, investors are willing to pay higher prices to purchase the stocks, which in turn provides more incentives for rm B to mimic rm G in equilibrium.
The Complementary Role of Accounting
So far, we nd that accounting can discipline the manager's inecient investment in addition to information provision for valuation purposes. In this section, we will disentangle these two eects by examining how accounting quality aects equilibrium market prices.
Proposition 3. 1. When q = 1, P (y h ) is strictly increasing in τ , and P (y l ) is strictly decreasing in τ .
2. When q < 1,
(b) There exists a threshold τ * 0 s.t. P (y l ) is strictly increasing in τ if and only if
We discuss the eect of accounting quality on P (y h ) and P (y l ) separately. To see why P (y h ) is unambiguously increasing in accounting quality, we rewrite P (y h ) as a function of the conjecturedq and τ , and the marginal eect becomes
First, investors update their beliefs on θ upon observing the earnings report. When accounting is more informative, investors believe that rms that receive y h are more likely of G type, so the market price P (y h ) increases, i.e., ∂P (y h ,q, τ ) ∂τ > 0. We dene this direct eect as the informational eect. Second, when accounting becomes suciently precise, it starts to discipline rm B's overinvestmentas evidenced by a lower qand investors' conjecturedq also changes correspondingly. To be more precise, since investors anticipate that rm B invests less frequently, upon observing an investment, they rationally believe that the rm is more likely to be G, i.e., ∂P (y h ,q, τ ) ∂q < 0. Meanwhile, by Proposition 2, high quality accounting is more eective in preventing rm B from investing, i.e., dq dτ < 0. Taken together, accounting quality can also indirectly aect P (y h ) by changing the equilibriumq, which we dene as the disciplinary eect. Since both eects imply that P (y h ) increases with τ , the net eect must be positive. Finally, q = 1 is a special case in which the disciplinary eect does not exist, i.e.,
The case of P (y h ) is relatively straightforward. Next, we focus on a more interesting case on P (y l ). In a similar fashion, we separate the two eects as follows:
First, dierent from P (y h ), the informational eect on P (y l ) becomes negative, that is, ∂P (y l ,q, τ ) ∂τ < 0. This happens because upon observing y l , investors rationally believe that the rm is more likely of B type when the earnings report is more informative.
On the other hand, as τ increases, rm B is more disciplined and therefore investors' conjectured q decreases. In other words, investors still believe that rms that chose to invest are more likely to be G, even if the subsequently earnings reports are y l . As a result, the disciplinary eect remains positive. Therefore, τ moves P (y l ) in opposite directions, and the net eect is not obvious.
Proposition 3 suggests that P (y l ) increases in τ if and only if τ > τ * 0 .
8 We rst consider the extreme case in which τ approaches 1. From the perspective of statistics, y l reveals rm B almost for sure so P (y l ) should reach its minimum. However, the indierence condition
(1−τ )P (y h )+τ P (y l ) = K implies that lim τ →1 P (y l ) = K, which is the maximum of P (y l ).
The intuition for P (y l ) being increasing in τ is that when accounting becomes suciently precise, most uncertainty about θ has already been resolved upon which the investment decisions were made. By contrast, investors only receive incremental information from the earnings report itself. In other words, the disciplinary eect dominates the informational eect. To see this point, we dene P 0 (invest) as the market price after the investment being observed but before the earnings reports, i.e.,
Because there is no earnings report, the price only depends on the market's conjectureq, and the posterior probability is P r(G|I) = ρ ρ + (1 − ρ)q . As shown in Figure 1 , when τ increases, P 0 (invest) converges to P (y h ) and P 0 (no invest) converges to P (y l ), consistent with our intuition. A numerical example:
To formally show how investors' uncertainty varies, we adopt a commonly used measure of uncertainty: conditional variance. Specically, investors' information set at date 8 If we compare τ * 0 the threshold in Proposition 2,τ (ρ), we nd a sucient and necessary condition forτ (ρ) < τ * 0 is that M < ρ < 1 2
, and the parameter M is dened in the proof.
0 is Ω 1 = {I, N I}, and the level of uncertainty is V ar(θ|ω ∈ Ω 1 ). 3. Investors' uncertainty after observing the investment decision and the earnings re-
Now, we can quantify the disciplinary eect and informational eect as follows:
Denition 3. 1. The disciplinary eect is equivalent to
2. The informational eect is equivalent to
Specically, the disciplinary eect is equal to the amount of uncertainty resolved by rms' investment decisions; the informational eect is equal to the amount of uncertainty resolved by the earnings report itself. Proposition 4 conrms our intuition. In the pooling equilibrium, the investment decision has no information content, which means no uncertainty was resolved by observing the investment, i.e., W D = 0. However, the performance report is still useful for valuation purposes and therefore the informational eect is positive and strictly increasing in τ . In 9
We use the conditional variance of θ rather than the conditional variance ofC , because the market price only depends on the posterior belief of θ. Whether more uncertainty of θ is equivalent to more uncertainty ofC is unclearit also depends on P g and P b . 11 A numerical example is plotted in Figure   2 . In summary, we nd that when the earnings report is suciently informative, accounting serves its primary role in complementing other sources of information; whereas the role of information provision for valuation purposes is at best of second order.
The disciplinary eect in our paper corresponds to the conrmatory role of nancial reporting raised by Gigler and Hemmer (1998) , that is, mandatory disclosures serve their primary role of enhancing the credibility of managers' voluntary disclosures. We nd a similar result that under certain conditions, nancial reports can only provide a modest, but not overwhelming amount of information, because most information has already been preempted from other sources. However, the mechanism is totally dierent in our paper.
11 We implicitly assume that the investment must be publicly observable before the earning report. To see why, suppose the two pieces of information are revealed at the same time, then we cannot rule out an alternative explanationmost uncertainty about θ was resolved by the interim earnings report and the investment is only marginally informative. As a result, we need to be very cautious about the dierential value relevance of balance sheet versus income statement that will be discussed in the text later, because nancial statements are simultaneously disseminated to the public. However, rms' investments can be continuously disclosed or revealed via many other channels in reality, which are usually more timely than nancial statements such as the earnings report. Therefore, it is still reasonable to assume the balance sheet information comes out prior to the earnings report.
First, in their model, voluntary disclosures are motivated by the principal's goal of ecient contracting, because the manager's private information is more value relevant compared to the interim performance report. We made the same assumption about management's informational advantage, but also assume that any direct communication, such as voluntary disclosures, is unveriable. Second, the economic magnitude of the disciplinary eect is probably much signicant in our model than the conrmatory role in Gigler and Hemmer (1998) , because the conrmatory role only enhances eective risk-sharing between the risk averse manager and risk neutral shareholders. However, the disciplinary eect in our paper changes rms' real decisions such as investments, and therefore increases shareholders' value and ultimately improves resource allocation from the social planer's perspective. Finally, Gigler and Hemmer (1998) do not explicitly model the quality of earnings reports nor the capital market, but rather use the frequency of mandatory disclosures to represent the informativeness of an accounting system. In that regard, our paper more directly tackles the o-equilibrium role of accounting by examining the association between accounting quality and equilibrium prices.
Our results also relate to the literature on dierential value relevance of balance sheets and income statements. For example, Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997) and Francis and Schipper (1999) nd that the value relevance of earnings (book value) has decreased (increased), even though the combined value relevance has not changed. The decline of usefulness in earnings was attributed to more transitory items or potential managerial manipulation; in other words, earnings quality declines. We provide a completely dierent explanation, that is, the low (high) value relevance of income statements (balance sheets) possibly suggests that accounting is working more eectively in preventing inecient investment and improving the overall information environment.
Accounting Quality, Price Sensitivity and ERC
Prior literature denes high quality accounting as earnings providing more information about a rm's nancial performance and thus improving decision making (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010) . Commonly used proxies for earnings quality can be classied into three categories: properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings, and external indicators of earnings misstatements. The rst category includes earnings persistence (Nissim and Penman, 2001) , abnormal accrual (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) , timely loss recognition (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) , etc. In the second category, earnings response coecient (ERC) or the R 2 from the earnings-returns model are often interpreted as earnings quality (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Liu and Thomas, 2000) . Finally, the last category includes Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), restatements, and internal control deciencies reported are often viewed as indicators of errors or earnings management (Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008; Marinovic, 2013 ). In our model, accounting quality is dened as the extent to which earnings reports reect future cash ow, consistent with the previous denition. Although this concept is theoretically intuitive, it is dicult to match with a good measure using archival data. Therefore, in this section, we examine the association between our denition of accounting quality with two proxies in the second category, price sensitivity and ERC.
Proposition 5. 1. When q = 1,
2. When q < 1, there exists a unique τ * 2 , such that
First, the price sensitivity to earnings can be written as
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Proposition 5 suggests that that the price dierence could be decreasing in accounting quality if τ is suciently high. The intuition is the same as above: When the performance report is working the best in disciplining managers' inecient investment, the investment can already convey a large amount of information and thus induce a strong market response. However, since most information has already been preempted, the market responsiveness to the subsequent earnings announcement, as measured by price sensitivity to earnings, becomes marginal.
Second, ERC, dened as unexpected returns (U R) divided by unexpected earnings (U E), measures the average change in prices associated with a dollar change in earnings, and therefore captures capital market responsiveness to earnings. Before the earnings announcement, investors only observe whether the rm made an investment. Therefore, the expected earnings are E(y|I) = P r(y h |I) × y h + P r(y l |I) × y l 12 To see why this term represents price sensitivity, consider a regression model P rice = α + βInvestment + γEarnings + ε. Put in the data and we have P (y h ) = α + βK + γy h and P (y l ) = α + βK + γy l , and therefore γ = P (y h ) − P (y l )
In addition, P r(y h |I) further depends on investors' conjectureq, which means P r(y h |I) = τ P r(G|I)
Suppose the realized earnings at date 2 are y h ; then U E is the dierence between realized and expected earnings U E = y h − E(y|I) = P rob(y l |I)(y h − y l )
Now we turn to unexpected returns. After the rm makes the investment, the price becomes P 0 (invest) as in equation (4). Meanwhile, the law of iterated expectation implies that E(P (y)|I) = E(E(C|y, I)|I) = P 0 (invest)
As a result, the expected return is
In other words, because stock price instantaneously reects all available information, the expected return at any time is 0. Similarly, given y h , the realized return is
Corollary 2. ERC is strictly decreasing in accounting quality when τ is suciently high.
Corollary 2 is a direct result of Proposition 5. ERC may be decreasing in τ for two reasons: On the one hand, as Proposition 5 shows, the price sensitivity to earnings goes down when τ is suciently large, which means the numerator of equation (5) decreases.
On the other hand, since rm B is better disciplined when τ increases, investors in turn attach a higher price to rms that made the investment, i.e., P 0 (invest) increases. As a result, the denominator of equation (5) also goes up, implying that it becomes more expensive to acquire the stock holding everything else constant. Overall, taking the two eects together, ERC is decreasing in accounting quality when τ is adequately high. In summary, the rationale of using market responsiveness to earnings to measure accounting quality is that, given an ecient market, it is an estimate of the amount of new information conveyed by earnings announcements. However, we nd a counterintuitive result that less intensive market responsiveness to earnings may imply higher quality accounting, because the earnings report may have enhanced the credibility of other sources of information. In other words, more intensive market responsiveness to earnings is not equivalent to an overall more informative accounting system. Therefore, to evaluate the usefulness of accounting, one cannot only look at the equilibrium actions or to the equilibrium market responsiveness.
Discussions

Alternative Representation
We extend the model in this section. Specically, we assume 1. Productivity θ ∈ [0, 1] and P r(S|θ) = θ. The prior distribution is θ ∼ f (θ) and f (θ) is the density function.
2. The interim performance report is a mapping fromC to Z 13 : P rob(z h |S) = λ, P rob(z h |F ) = 1 − λ, and 1 2 < λ < 1.
3. θ and Z are independent conditional onC , i.e., earnings are correlated with the manager's private information only because they are both correlated with the terminal 13 To dierentiate from the main model, here we denote accounting signals as Z, and λ is the precision of the earnings report.
cash ow.
We study this alternative representation for two reasons: First, given a binary θ in our main model, the equilibrium is inevitability discrete and the mixed strategy is dicult to interpret. Second, to capture the idea that the manager has superior private information, we assume the earnings report Y is independent ofC conditional on θ. However, in reality, accounting is a set of summarized statistics from past transactions, and thus may not be completely subsumed by the manager's information. In this alternative specication, we assume that accounting is associated with the manager's private information only because they are both informative about the expected return of the investment. Consequently, accounting quality means the extent to which accruals map into cash ow realizations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) , and a better match signies high accounting quality (Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan, 2014 Similar to Lemma 1, we nd that in the rst best, the manager invests if and only if a priori the investment has positive NPV. However, although there is no information asymmetry between the manager and outside investors, the interim report is incrementally useful in predicting future cash ow. In other words, accounting always serves its informational role even in a frictionless world.
In the second best, however, the manager always overinvests, as evidenced by θ SB ≤ θ F B . Therefore, when the manager observes θ ∈ [θ SB , θ F B ), he still chooses to invest in the negative NPV project. This happens because investors infer θ from the rm's investment decisions rather than by directly observing θ. As a result, some low types are able to pool with high types by investing and thereby obtain higher stock prices. At the extreme, where θ SB = 0, all types will invest, leading to the worst pooling equilibrium. Similar to the main model, we nd that the pooling equilibrium is sustained only when the a priori mean of θ is suciently high and accounting quality is suciently low.
Finally, we nd that high quality accounting works more eectively in alleviating overinvestment, consistent with Proposition 3. We only discuss the intuition and leave the formal proof to the appendix. Suppose accounting quality increases from λ L to λ H , but the equilibrium threshold remains θ L ; the law of iterated expectation implies that
In other words, if more information makes certain types better o, some other types must become worse o. What's more, a high type would naturally prefer more precise information to separate himself from other low types, whereas a low type prefers less information to pool with other high types. Therefore, as accounting quality increases to λ H , the expected payo for a low (high) type decreases (increases). When accounting quality is λ L , type θ SB is indierent between investing or not investing. Nevertheless, when accounting quality increases to λ H , type θ SB must become worse o and thus choose not to invest. 
Since both ∂P (z, τ ) ∂θ SB and dθ SB dλ are positive, the disciplinary eect drives the price up for both z h and z l . By contrast, the informational eect will increases the price P (z h ) and decrease the price P (z l ). Dierent from Proposition 3, however, the comparison of these two eects becomes extremely sensitive to the distribution of θ, and we cannot make any comparison unless the function f (θ) is specied. In Appendix B, we nd that two simple distributions can lead to completely dierent results. The key driving forces in our main model are that the manager's private information is more value relevant compared to accounting information; and the manager's action is able to convey a large amount of his private information. We conjecture that with these two forces, our result on market responsiveness will continue to hold qualitatively in other model specications.
Entropy and Informational Gain
Another commonly used measure to quantify the amount of information is Shannon's entropy (Shannon, 2001) . Formally, for a discrete random variable X with possible values {x 1 , ..., x n } and probability mass function P (X), Shannon's entropy, or information entropy, H is dened as
Entropy refers to disorder or uncertainty of the state, and a larger value means the level of uncertainty is higher. Furthermore, information gain, a synonym for KullbackLeibler divergence, measures how much information was obtained from observing an outcome of a random variable that is correlated with an unknown state. Formally, it is dened as the change in Shannon's entropy from a prior state to a state that takes some information as given: IG(X, a) = H(X) − H(X|a). The expected value of the information gain, i.e., the weighted average of IG(X, a) for all possible a, captures the reduction in entropy of X by learning the state of the random variable A. This denition has been used in the literature, for example, Jiang and Yang (2017) use entropy to capture the informational constraint faced by the manager.
With the above notation, we have the following denition:
Denition 4. 1. The prior information is
2. The information after observing the investment decision is H 1 (θ) = H 1 (θ|I).
The information after observing the investment decision and accounting information is H 2 (θ) = H(θ|I, Y ).
Obviously, more information can always reduce investors' uncertainty about θ, i.e.,
However, the marginal eect is dierent. The informational gain resulting from observing rms' investment decisions is V D = H 0 (θ) − H 1 (θ), which is also equivalent to the magnitude of the disciplinary eect. In a similar way, the informational gain resulting from observing rms' earnings reports is V I = H 1 (θ) − H 2 (θ), which is equivalent to the magnitude of the information eect.
Proposition 7. 1. When q = 1, V D = 0, V I > 0 and strictly increases in τ .
2. When q < 1:
(c) When τ is suciently small, the informational eect dominates; when τ is suciently large, the disciplinary eect dominates.
Proposition 7 is consistent with Proposition 4 which measures uncertainty with conditional variance. Specically, when q < 1, both the disciplinary and informational eect are positive, and the disciplinary eect is strictly increasing in accounting quality. The last result in Proposition 7 is weaker as the monotonicity conditions for V I cannot be solved analytically. Nevertheless, we still nd a consistent result that the informational eect is overwhelmed by the disciplinary eect when accounting quality is suciently high, because most information has already been preempted before the actual earnings announcement.
Concluding Remarks
Value relevance has been one of the most prevalent criteria for assessing the usefulness of nancial reporting by accounting academics and standard setters. Nevertheless, several studies (Wallman, 1995; Lev, 1989) have noted that earnings can explain very little of the contemporaneous price movement, and conclude that nancial reporting fails to fulll its mission. Gigler and Hemmer (1998) propose a conrmatory role to explain the empirical regularity and get the opposite conclusion. In this paper, we broaden the insights of Gigler and Hemmer (1998) and study the complementary role of nancial reporting in enhancing the credibility of other sources of information.
We adopt the setting from the real eects literature: A benevolent manager with some private information chooses whether to invest in a risky project in order to maximize interim stock prices. The earnings report is produced and disseminated after the manager makes the investment, but is always less valuable and timely compared to the manager's private information, similar to Gigler and Hemmer (1998) . We nd that information asymmetry between the management and investors leads to investment ineciency. When the quality of the earnings report is higher, the mitigating eect becomes stronger, suggesting that nancial reporting plays a disciplinary role for the manager' misbehavior.
The main result of this paper is that, the disciplinary role will dominate the information provision role when earnings quality becomes suciently high. This could happen because investors only receive an incremental but not overwhelming amount of information from the earnings announcement, as more valuable information has already been incorporated when the investment decision was made. Using two commonly used measure of uncertainty, conditional variance and entropy, we conrm our intuition. As a result, when the market responsiveness to earnings is weak, accounting is possibly working the best in fullling its o-equilibrium role, which is in stark contrast with the aforementioned empirical literature. We argue that to evaluate the eectiveness of accounting, one cannot look to the equilibrium prices on a stand-alone basis; instead, we should measure its contribution to the overall information environment.
of Accounting and Economics 43 (2) Proof. We prove a more general result: the equilibrium holds for any information structure Y which satises (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). SupposeỸ ∈ Ω and Ω is bounded,Ỹ is correlated with θ in the sense of MLRP:
is strictly increasing in y. Therefore, high earnings are more favorable than low earnings, because the posterior belief P r(G|y) is strictly increasing in y.
Suppose in equilibrium rm G invests with probability h ∈ [0, 1], and rm B invests with probability q ∈ [0, 1]. The following results together prove the proposition.
Lemma 2. q = 0, h > 0 can never be sustained in equilibrium.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose q = 0, h > 0 is an equilibrium; in this case, investment perfectly reveals rm G. By rational expectation, P (invest) = P g R and P (no invest) = K. Anticipating this price rule, rm G will take h = 1, and rm B will also deviate to q = 1 as investing yields a higher price. Therefore, in equilibrium rm B will always invest with some positive probability. Furthermore, fully separation is not attainable.
Lemma 3. If rm B chooses q < 1 ⇒ E(P (y)|B) = K.
Suppose in equilibrium q < 1, but E(P (y)|B) > K. It implies that rm B can obtain a higher payo by always investing, i.e., B deviates to q = 1. Investors in turn anticipate that B has incentives to deviate, and therefore revise their belief. Similarly, if E(P (y)|B) < K, rm B will deviate to never invest and investors' belief also changes accordingly. Therefore, when rm B chooses q < 1, he must be indierent between investing and not investing. Following the literature, we assume that when the manager is indierent, he will take the conjecturedq.
Lemma 4. For any strategy of B, rm G will always invest, i.e., h = 1.
First, MLRP suggests that P r(G|y) is strictly increasing in y P (y) = P r(G|Î, y)(
so price P (y) is strictly increasing in y. Suppose rm B chooses q = 1 in equilibrium, the expected return from investing is greater or equal to K, i.e.,
Because Y |θ satises rst order stochastic dominance and P (y) is strictly increasing in y, we have E(P (y)|G) > E(P (y)|B) = K, suggesting h = 1. The o-equilibrium belief is that P rob(B|no invest) = 1, i.e., if the rm did not invest, investors believe it is B.
Suppose rm B chooses q < 1 in equilibrium, from the previous result, E(P (y)|B) = K. Similarly, we have E(P (y)|G) > E(P (y)|B) = K, suggesting h = 1.
Lemma 5. Firm B chooses q = 1 if and only if E(P (y)|B) ≥ K, and investors believê h =q = 1.
The pooling and hybrid equilibria are mutually exclusive. Given investors believe that h =q = 1, if the corresponding prices are such that E(P (y)|B) ≥ K, rm B nds it optimal to always invest, and the conjecture is sustained. Otherwise, Given the belief h =q = 1, if E(P (y)|B) < K, rm B will never invest, suggesting that the belief h =q = 1 is incorrect. As a result, investors must revise their belief to the point at which rm B is indierent between investing or not.
Before closing the proof, we check a special case in which no rm invests, i.e., h = 0, q = 0. If this is an equilibrium, investors must believe thatĥ =q = 0, and prices are constant K. The action investing is o equilibrium, so Bayes' theorem does not apply when investing is observed. To support this equilibrium, we assume that the o-equilibrium belief is P r(B|I) = 1. Anticipating this belief, both G and B have no incentive to deviate and invest. However, this equilibrium is not interesting or sustainable. In fact, certain equilibrium renement rules can eliminate this case. Since it is not our focus to eliminate multiple equilibria, we ignore this special case in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. As Proposition 1 suggests, rm G invests with probability 1 and rm B invests with probability q ≤ 1, so we can derive the posterior probabilities:
P r(G|I, y h ) = P r(G)P r(I|G)P r(y h |I, G) P r(G)P r(I|G)P r(y h |I, G) + P r(B)P r(I|B)P r(y h |I, B) = P r(G)P r(I|G)P r(y h |G) P r(G)P r(I|G)P r(y h |G) + P r(B)P r(I|B)P r(y h |B)
The second equality is because θ is a sucient statistic for invest w.r.t. Y . At date 0, the rm maximizes its expected price, i.e., Max I
Firm B is indierent between investing and not investing if
)R , and 0 < M < 1. Rational expectation requires thatq = q, so we can replaceq with q.
However, by the proof of Proposition 1 suggests, the equilibrium may be pooling. If so, investors believeĥ =q = 1, and under this belief, rm B still nds it optimal to always invest, i.e., E(P (y)|B) ≥ K. Expand this equation and we have
To examine when equation (10) is satised, we discuss two cases as follows:
, and the sign of Γ is ambiguous. If Γ < 0, because is τ − τ 2 is negative and M ρ − M ρ 2 is positive, (10) cannot be satised.
If Γ > 0, the function Γ(τ 2 − τ ) + M ρ − M ρ 2 is strictly increasing in τ ∈ ( 1 2 , 1), and the minimum value is 0.25M − 0.25ρ > 0, so (14) is also not satised. Therefore, when M > ρ, equation (10) can never be satised.
Case 2: M ≤ ρ, and so Γ > 0. In this case, Γ(τ
, the minimum is 0.25M − 0.25ρ < 0, and when τ = 1,
the maximum is M ρ − M ρ 2 > 0. So there exists a unique thresholdτ (ρ) such that (10) is satised if and only if τ <τ (ρ), whereτ (ρ) = 1 2
Therefore, we nd that rm B chooses q = 1 if and only if M ≤ ρ and τ ≤τ (ρ).
Lastly, we show how q varies with τ and ρ. When q < 1, rewrite the indierence condition as
Based on implicit function theorem,
To see why dq dρ > 0, dene s = (1 − ρ) ρ q and rewrite equation (11) as
Obviously, the solution of equation (17) does not depend on ρ; in other words, ds dρ = 0.
In addition, by denition, we have ds dρ
Lastly, the cross partial is
Proof of Corollary 1 Proof. Following Proposition 2, we have
In summary, by the chain rule, we have (1) and (3) ∂q ∂K < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Case 1: q = 1. In this case,
Case 2: q < 1. From Proposition 2, we rewrite P (y h ) and P (y l ) in terms of s
Since ∂q ∂τ < 0; and 1 − τ τ strictly decreases in τ , we must have ∂P (y h ) ∂τ > 0.
(b)
To see the monotonicity, we dene t τ 1 − τ s and γ τ 1 − τ ⇒ γ ∈ (1, ∞) and 
Equation (16) has a unique positive solution
In a nutshell, P (y l ) is decreasing in τ if and only if τ < τ * 0 .
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, we have V ar
2 by denition.
Second, since not investing perfectly reveals B, V ar(θ|N I) = 0. However, when the rm invests,
Finally, for realized signal y, we have
To evaluate the expected conditional variance, we replaceq with q and
Furthermore, when τ → 1, W I → V ar [θ] , and W I is strictly increasing in τ . 
it suggests that high quality accounting can more eectively resolve investors' uncertainty upon observing investment. As a result, by our denition,
implying that the disciplinary eect is strictly increasing in τ . Similarly,
So investors' uncertainty at date 3 is also decreasing in τ . But the incremental eect W I ,
Plug in equilibrium q, and after some tedious algebra we nd that dW I dτ 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When q = 1, it is a direct result from Proposition 3.
When q < 1, by the indierence condition
and we want to examine when ∂u ∂τ < 0. By the denition of
Replace s with u in equation (16) and we have 
where
Now we plug in W (τ ) and rearrange terms. After some algebra we get
i.e., ∂u ∂τ < 0 requires conditions (a) and (b) be satised at the same time.
Condition (a) ⇔ (4M + 1)τ 2 − (4M + 1)τ + M > 0, and because 0 < M < 1 and 0.5 < τ < 1, it is equivalent to τ > 1 2 + 1 2
Dene the function in the curly bracket as G(τ ), which is a polynomial function of τ to the power of 6. First, when 0 < M < 1, G(τ ) = 0 has four real solutions in the interval (0, 1) ; second, function
Therefore, G(τ ) = 0 has two solutions τ 1 , τ 2 in (0, 1 2 ), and two solutions τ 3 , τ 4 in ( 1 2 , 1). Condition (b) is then equivalent to 0.5 < τ < τ 3
14 Mathematica code is available upon request.
or τ > τ 4
15 . As a result, 
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. In the rst best, investors observe θ and Z and the stock price will be P (z, θ) = E(C|z, θ). A manager who observes θ maximizes the expected price at date 0, because of the law of iterated expectations.
In the second best, we rst show that the equilibrium must be a threshold. Suppose the market believes that managers who observe θ ∈ Ω will invest, then the corresponding prices are P (z h ) = P r(S|I, z h )R and P (z l ) = P r(S|I, z l )R ⇒ P (z h ) = P r(S|I)P r(z h |I, S) P r(S|I)P r(z h |I, S) + P r(F |I)P r(z h |I,
The second equality uses the assumption that θ and Z are independent conditional onC .
Therefore, P (z h ) > P (z l ) as long as 0 < E(θ|I) < 1. For the manager who observes θ, 15 It is a general property for any polynomial equation
because of conditional independence P r(z|θ) = P r(S|θ)P r(z|S, θ) + P r(F |θ)P r(z|F, θ) = θP r(z|S) + (1 − θ)P r(z|F ) So for type θ, the expected payo for investing is E(P (z, I)|θ) = P r(z h |θ)P (z h ) + P r(z l |θ)P (z l )
Therefore, the expected payo is strictly increasing in θ, suggesting that the equilibrium must be a threshold θ SB .
Now we examine when θ SB = 0. For the lowest type θ = 0, its expected payo is
If prices are such that equation (21) is greater than K, the lowest type will invest, leading to a pooling equilibrium. If so, investment is completely uninformative and P r(S|I) =
So θ SB = 0 if and only if conditions (c) and (d) are satised at the same time.
We next prove θ SB < θ F B . Suppose instead θ SB ≥ θ F B ; type θ F B will not invest in the second best. However, given that investors believes the equilibrium is θ SB , the price for any realization z is P (z) = E(C|θ ≥ θ SB , z) > E(C|θ = θ F B , z) . Therefore, the expected payo for θ F B is
Lastly, we show that θ SB increases in λ. Dene the conditional expectation E(θ|θ ≥ t) = H(t), obviously t < H(t) < 1 and H(t) is increasing in t. In equilibrium, type θ SB must be indierent between between investing and not investing:
[θ SB λ + (1 − θ SB )(1 − λ)]P (z h ) + [θ SB + λ − 2λθ SB ]P (z l ) = K Dene equation (24) as L 1 (θ SB , λ) and we have the the partial derivative:
It is negative because θ SB < H(θ SB ). 
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. First, H 0 (θ) = −(ρlog b ρ + (1 − ρ)log b (1 − ρ)) and H 1 (θ) = P r(invest) × H(θ|I) + P r(no invest) × H(θ|no invest). Since investors know for sure θ = B upon observing no investment, there is no residual uncertainty and H 1 (θ) = P r(invest) × H(θ|I). Similarly, H 2 (θ) = P r(invest, y h ) × H(θ|I, y h ) + P r(invest, y l ) × H(θ|I, y l ). Therefore, we have As we discussed in Section 4, how market prices move with accounting quality is very sensitive to the distribution of θ. To highlight the distinction, we provide two ad hoc examples in this section and make a qualitative statement at the end.
Example 1: Uniform Distribution: θ ∼ U [0, 1].
A uniform prior allows us to calculate the conditional expectation as E[θ|θ > t] = 1 + t 2 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. It turns out that θ SB is a solution for a cubic function. Therefore, we can compare the date 1 and date 2 stock price as illustrated in the following graph. The threshold equilibrium is then degenerated to the mixed strategy, similar to the main model. However, a fully revealing equilibrium is plausible in this case if the accounting information is adequately precise. The intuition is that, if the earnings report almost perfectly reveals future cash ow, the manager's private information becomes marginally useful. As a result, even if rm B pretends to be rm G by investing and investors also believe so, he will ultimately be revealed with high chances and thus receive the low price.
In other words, even under the most optimistic belief of P r(G|invest) = 1, rm still B nds it not optimal to invest. The fully equilibrium is not interesting as the rst best is attained, so we only focus on the case in which rm B takes a mixed strategy. For example, suppose K = 1, R = 2, we nd that rm B takes a mixed strategy if and only if 0 < λ < 0.939. Results are plotted in Figure 5 and 6..
With the two examples above, we can observe the dierence qualitatively. Under the uniform distribution, the manager's private information is by nature of low quality in the sense that the variance is extremely high. Since rms' investment decisions can only reect the manager's private information, the level of uncertainty resolved by investment is at most moderate. For example, in the rst best, investors only know that θ > θ F B upon (a) Stock Price: P 0 (invest) and P (z) (b) Price Sensitivity and ERC P 0 (invest) does not converge to P (z h ), and P (z l ) does not converge to P (no invest).
However, under the degenerated Bernoulli distribution, the manager's private information is of high quality as evidenced by its low variance a prior. The earnings report, however, is only incrementally more informative about the fundamentalC , similar to the assumption in our main model and in Gigler and Hemmer (1998) . Furthermore, since both the manager's private information and the investment decision are of the same dimension, investment can potentially deliver most information content from management's private knowledge. Taken together, when accounting is fullling its objective, rms' investment decisions becomes suciently useful in resolving investors' uncertainty, whereas the actual earnings report is only marginal. Figure 6 shows that P 0 (invest) converges to P (z h ) and P (z l ) converges to P (no invest), consistent with Figure 1 . In addition, both the price sensitivity and ERC are decreasing in λ when accounting is suciently precise,
suggesting that high quality accounting may decrease capital market responsiveness to earnings reports.
In summary, we conjecture that our results will hold as long as the manager has more valuable private information compared to the earnings report, and the manager's actions can eectively convey his private information.
